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INTRODUCTION

Theor etical models of underd evelop ed countr ies often draw policy
con~
clusio ns concer ning variou s develo pment strate gies withou t explic
itly tak
ing into accom1 t the role of the govern ment.

The focus is usuall y on the

relati onshi p betwee n agricu lture and indust ry rather than betwee
n the private and public sector s.

Yet to :lgnore . the specif ic contri bution of the

govern ment as a provid er of crucia l develo pment inputs or to
fail to con
sider the govern ment as a decisi on maker having its mm set
of prefer ences
is to omit an impor tant part of the develo pment model.

The purpos e of

this paper is t~ introd ~ce the govern ment as a sector having
its own set
of objec tives, instru ments , and constr aints and to explor e the
result ing
intera ctions betwee n the govern ment and the privat e sector .
Thf2.re are a number of impor tant chara cteris tics of the govern
ment sector in underd evelop ec count ries that deserv e specia l attent ion.

First, a

signif icant share of govern ment activi ty in develo ping count
ries has a di
rectly produ ctive effect on other sector s of the economy.

Goverr naent fi

nanced infras tructu re and educa tion, for examp le, ofte:i form
a major part
of the physic al and human capita l stock of the c.ount ry.

Govern ment ser--

vices in transp ortati on, commu nicatio ns, resear ch, peace and
order, etc.

are intenn ediate goods which affect the level of proau ctivity
in the pri
vate sector .

Expen diture policy is thus a crucia l instru ment of dev~lo p

ment strate gy.
Second , the capaci ty· of the govern ment to earn revenu e is limite
d
severe ly by the costs of collec ting taxes· and by politi cal and
ideolo e;ical
const raints on the tax struct ure.

In many underd evelop ed count ries, the
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large st share of reven ue is deriv ed from indir e.ct
taxes on a limit ed num
ber of expo rted or impo rted comm oditie s. The reven
ue of the. gover nmen t
depen ds there fore upon the grow th of taxab le secto
rs.
Final ly~ the gover nmen t secto r can appr opria tely
be viewe d as an in·
stitu tion withi n socie ty havin g its own goals and
prefe rence s 1some of
which may be in harmony \Tith the objec tives of the
priva te secto r and
some of which may be in conf lict. These goals are
deter mine d by the suecifj_c poli tical proce ss of the coun try and refle
ct the inter ests and powe r
of vario us press ure group s as well as the desi.r es
of the state burea ucrac y
and ambi tions of the rulin 8 elite . In techn ical
terns , we canno t assum e
the gover nmen t is in all cases attem pting to achie
ve Paret o effic iency for
the coun try as a whole but inste ad we must vie,-,
the gover nmen t as maximiz·
ing spec ific goals of its m-m subje ct to. spec ific
cons train ts.*
Thes e·pri ncipl es of prod uctiv e expe nditu re, J.j_mi
ted tax capa city, and
i

spec ific gover nmen t prefe rence func tions , taken
toget her, imply a quas imark et mech anism to deter mine the grow th of the
gpver Dmen t secto r and its
impa ct on the priva te secto r. If gover nmen t expe
nditu re polic ies fail to
stimu late the grow th of the econo my, and in parti
cula r those secto rs from
·whic h it deriv es its taxes , gover nmen t reven ue
cease s to grow, and its ex
pansi on must come to a halt. For surv ival and s~owt
h~ the gover nmen t must
alloc ate some of its resou rces in direc tions that
will gene rate incom e.
This, howe ver, sets limit s on gover nmen t beha vior
withi n which it choos es
accor ding to its prefe rence func tion.
*See C. P. Kind le berge r, "Grou p Be1:a vior and Inter
natio nal Trade ';.
!
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The Ref lect:lo n Ratio s
Forma lly, we may deriv e the relev ant relati onshi p betwe
en the priva te
and publi c secto rs as follow s.

The size of the gover nment secto r is con-

strain ed by its budge t equat ion
(1. 1)

G = R

+

B

·where G equal s total expen diture s,; R total reven ue and
B net borro wing.
Ignor ing B for the moment, the size of G and its rate
of growt h throug h
time depen ds upon the level and rate of growt h of R.

The point of de

partu re for this artic le is that there is a funct !onal
depen dence of R
upon G which may be calle d the refle ction ratio .
Our first princ iple noted above says that the level of
activ ity of
vario us secto rs of the economy is funct ional ly relate d
to the expen di
ture polic y of the gover nment .
(1. 2)

X

This relati or:.sh ip can be ,-,ritt en as

= F(g)

where Xis a vecto r of indic es of econo mic priva te econo
mic activ ity, and
g a gover nment expen diture vecto r whose eleme nts
(g , g , .. ,gn) denot e
1

2

the level of activ ity of

a

parti cular gover nment funct ion.• ;~

The secon d princ iple state s that gover nment reven ue will
depen d unon

the vecto r of priva te econo mic activ ities
(1. 3)

R = tX

where R equal s total reven ue and tis a tax vecto r whose
eleme nts are the
.
~

given tax rates assoc iated with each priva te econo mic
activ ity.

We as

sume for this paper that the tax struc ture repre sente d
by this•v ector
*He assume the follow ing condi tions: ·
X =

X if

g

= 0 , ax
a
8

a2x
ag

>_ 0, ~ - < 0.

.- 4 tends to be stable over t:lme.

Our primary concern is to analyze the

effect of changing g, given t as a constraint.

In underdeveloped coun

tries, it can reasonably be argued that governments have only limited
scope for changing t within a given economic structure,
run it can thus be viewed as exogeneous.

In the short

An analysis of changes int,

especially the discontinuous jumps that occur with economic revolution,
is beyond the scope of the present paper.*
Combining these equations we obtain the reflection ratio

(1.4)

G = t F(g) + B

which indicates that the level of government expenditures is· functionally
determined by its composition.
Another type of reflection ratio can be devised as follows.

The

government sector requires certain inputs from the rest of the economy,
e.g., imported goods, labor~ raw materials, etc.

But government expen-

diture influences the supply curve of these inputs.

Government help to

export industries, for example, increases. the supply of foreign exchange,
while government help to a3riculture lowers the price of food and hence
the supply price of labor and intermediate goods, and government ex~endi
ture on educatior;. increases the supply of skilled personnel.

These rela-

*Although we are assuming this feature _as a stylized fact of underde
veloped countries, considerable empirical estimation remains to be done.
This hypothesis implies that _a regression of revenue on the level of activ
ity in key sectors would yield stable parameters and a high correlation co
efficient over long periods of time. It is to be expected that the struc·
ture might shift at given points of time such as when a country moves from,
colonial to independent status but that it would remain stable within a
given period. Data exist for testing this hypothesis, though the relevant
investigations have not yet been made. ·
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tionships generate a second type of feedback of governmen t expenditu re

on governmen t expenditu re.
This general relations hip between governme ntal inputs and its o~m
expenditu re can be illustrate d in the following simple model.

Assume

the governmen t uses only one factor of productio n, labor (L), and the
amour.t it can employ is equal t.o total revenue (E) divided "by the wage
rate (w),

If we define the productiv ity of each worker as 2., the total

output of the governmen t sector is then given by
(LS)

·A certain portion of total governmen t expenditu re, say, g

2

is assumed to

have a direct effect on either the productiv ity of governmen t labor (a)
or its cost (w).

The second type.of reflectio n ratio can then be derived

.as
(1. 6)

·a
- ==

w

A Hodel of the Two Types of Reflectio n Rntios

We can now summarize our basic relations hip between the private and

public sectors in the followinE, simplifie d set of equations :i
(2 .1)

(2. 2)

gO = G - gl

(2. 3)

R == pl (g.l)

(2. 4)

-Ha =

-

~

'-'2

p2(g2).

*Fonnally , we may consider the governmen t having a cost constrain t
R = wL and a productio n relaUons hip G = aL. Solving we derive (1.5) •
. i-We have ignored net borrowing of the governmen t (B) in this model.

E~ua tion (2.2) s::ate s that gover nmen t activ ity can
be divid ed into
three kinds :

g

0

which has no direc tly prod uctiv e effec t on the econo
my

in the perio d under cons idera tion but is eithe r
a gover nmen t consu mptio n
item or a long range devel opme nt act:l vity; g which
has a direc t effec t
1
on outpu t in the priva te secto r and hence on the
gove rnme nt's reven ue as
descr ibed by equa tion (2.3) ; and g

2

which has a direc t effec t on eithe r

the prod uctiv ity of labor in the gover nmen t secto
r or its cost [equa tion.
(2.4) ].

The total outpu t of the gover nmen t as [!iven by (2.1)
can then

be rewri t·ten as

This mode l can be seen schem atica lly in Figur e 1
which demo nstra tes
the two feedb ack loops from gover nmen t expe nditu
re to ·8ove rnmen t expe ndi
ture. This illus trate s, for exam ple, that even
if the gover nmen t is
inter ested in maxim izing deve~ opme nt-ex pendi ture
such as g , it must spend
0
certa in sums on g _and g becau se of their indir
ect effec ts in produ cing
1
2

FIGURE 1
Two Feedb ack Loops f rorn G onto G

Model

G==-a-R

w

Bo~ G - gl - g2
-

· R· == o· 1 (oc,l )

(\

-

II.

lJ

--

THE GOVEPJlHEi:TT 1 S CEO ICE

The problem confro nting the governm ent in choosin g the optima l level
and allocat ion of expend iture is illustr ated in Figure 2.

For the presen t

we are consid ering only the first type of reflect ion ratios i.e.
the feedbac k from increas ed tax revenue .

9

pl or

As before , Bis set equal to zero.

It is furthe r assumed in the backgro und that there are three sectors
:

x

1

s

a taxed export or manufa cturing sector; x
a non--ta xed large agraria n and
27
se.rvice sector uhich supplie s an unlimit ed amount of labor at a .consta
nt
wage; and Gs the governm ent sector whose activit y affects x .
1
The reflect ion curve is picture d in quadra nt I which shows the total
level of governm ent expend iture as a functio n of the amount allocat ed
to
g •
1

It is derived as follows ~

-

Quadra nt IV shows the produc tivity 6£ the governm ent on the private
sector accordi ng t~ x = F(g ) where the curve is concave downward due
1
1
to diminis hing return s, F' > 0, F" < O. If the governm ent set g = 0,
it
1
is assumed that the level of private output would be x == x •
1
1
Quadra nt III indica tes the relatio nship between activit y in the private sector and the tax revenue of the governm ent.
are a consta nt propor tion of activit y in x

1

We have assumed taxes

but could easily explore the

case where taxes are. an inc·rea sing or decreas ing -propor tion.

It should be

noted that we have assumed that taxes have no disince ntive effect on
pro-·
duction .

This is not realis tic but could be relaxed by matine; the revenue

functio n concave to the x axis thereby changin g the shape of the reflec

1
tion curve in the first quadra nt.

I •

FIGURE 2
The Governm 2nt'

s Choice

x,
Hodel

x1
R

~

F(g )
1

e

t X
1

R •• G
G ~ p (g

1

Product ivity of Governm ent (F' > 0, 17n < O)

Revenue Function
Balanced Dudget {B "" 0)

1)_

R~flecti on Curve (p~ ~ O)

;:.· 10 -

The second quadrant shows the relations hip between revenue ~nd
gove:rnrnen t expenditu re.

Assuming a balanced budget, R :::: Gp the i;ela--

tJon.ship is a straight. 1.:l.ne with a li5° slope,
The reflectio n curve in quadrant I tells us the total amount of
governmen t expenclitui. '.'e assoc:tate d with any level of expenditu re on g •
1
It :ts der:tve<l by choosing various initial levels of g which determine
1
Xl' then R,_ ,.md finally back onto G, :', 'I'he horizonta l d:i.ffcrenc e between
the· reflectio n curve and a l-15° line indicates the surpJ.ug available to

What is the opt:l"mum point for the governmen t?

It is immed:tate ly

evident thc:•.t there is no obvious single best point :l.n the absence of a

sod.al welfare funct:!.on to evaluate the desirabi.l: tt:l.es of var.ious com·binat:!.ons of gover11.t"'Dent and private act1vi ty.

·Thus we must :lntroduce
'

*Given our assumptio ns, the reflection . curve is the m:trror image of
-the product:lv ity funcUon in quadrant IV, or
> 0, p 1 < O, ar:.d G :::: G
when g z: 0, We may also note that our E:econd type of""reflec tlon rela-·
1
:·
a
tionsh:.tp ·c: p
(g ), could be derived :i.n a s0L1e1-1hat sim:i..lar manner g:tven
2
H
2
R as in the foD.owins
diagram:

Pi

1
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our third principle of governmen t behavior.

It is unrealist ic to assume

that the governmen t in underdeve loped countries always maximizes some
vague notion of "general ,11elfare: 1 represent ing somehoH the comliined inter
ests and views of the populatio n as a ,friole.

It is also unrealist ic to

assume that the governmen t always strives to achieve Pareto optimalit y and
then redistrib utes using lump· sum taxes anc: transfers .

A particula r

governmen t is pushed and pulled by its own views of the world and by polit
ical pressures of various groups both internal and external.

We assume

instead that the governmen t (i.e. the state) in an underdeve lo:)ed country
has its own welfare function possibly diff~rent from a large section of
the private sector.

It is aµpropria te therefore , to analyze problems in

terms of the implicati ons and contradic tions of various possible social
welfare functions .
Suppose we make the crude assumptio n that the goverrnne nt's only
:

interest is g .
0

The

x1 sector, for example, may be a foreign firm oper-

ating in the export sector of no interest

to the governmen t except for

the revenue.i t provides through taxes which can then be spent on annies,
monument s, or developme nt.
·where g

0

The governmen t would then choose the point g ,

1

is a maximum. t,

Another crude assumptio n, with quite different effects, is that the
governme nt's only interest is in its total size .. It may, for example, try
to maximize G regardles s of compositi on because of the employmen t generat
ing aspects.
to zero.
;'/f,

g1

where g

This is the point which maximiz·es the total size of

- Pl (gl)

-

gl
is at a. maximum when

'0

go

The governmen t would then chose the point

<lgo

dgl

= 1 or when 81

::=

81·

x1

0

is equal

as well
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becau se of the parti cular assum ptions of this model .
!

.

A

gover mnent choos i~g

this pol:t.cy would there fore obtai n the large st possi ble
combi ned em!}loyment
in the expor t plus gover nmen t.sect or, at the expen se of
the rest of the econ~
omy if g were consi dered to be partl y develo pment expen
diture s with a long
0
gesta tion perio d.
In Fi.gur e 3, we can stnnm arize the vario us distri butio ns
betwe en g
g

1

(quad rant I) from the gover nmen t's point of vieu.

0

and

A socia l welfa re func

_tion , U(g , g ) is drawn to indic ate one possi ble solut
ion equat ing the mar
0
1
ginal rates of subst itutfo n and transf orma tion. Qur two
limit ing point s,
A and B, are indic ated to show the range of the gover nmen
t's choic e.
Neith er of these extrem es, howev er,
ment behav ior in a compl ex world .

is suffi cient to descr ibe gover n

In actua l fact, the· gover nment will as

sign utili ty weigh ts to a number of objec tives :

emplo yment , outpu t, size

of the priva te secto r, degre e of openn ess of the econom
y 1 etc. The propo si
tion remai ns empi ricall y empty as long as we do not lmoH
the conte nt of
the gover nmen t's prefe rence funct ion. None theles s, the
above analy sis con
tains an impor tant lesso n for resea rch on the struc ture
and perfor mance of
econo mies and the evalu ation of natio n al incom e.

The econo mic recor d

of a count ry does not merel y refle ct techn ologi cal produ
ction funct ions
and facto r suppl ies but also the taste s of the gover nment
.

Models whtch

omit this latte r featu re, and this is the case in most
theor etica l and
'
~

C
empi rical model s of under devel oped count ries, are there
fore 'i:ltisp ecifie d

to the exten t that the gover nment secto r is an impor
tant force in the econ

omy.

'.
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Figu re 3

- 14 III.

A BARGAINING MODEL

The refle ction ratio as deriv ed in the pfJ2~~ ~1i~~ ··,sect
ions focus es
on the alloc ation of gover nment expen diture solel y from
the point of view
of the gover nment itsel f.

For a given tax rate, the gover nment surpl us

go', rose to a maximum and then fell as.inc reasin g amoun
ts were spent en
11
produ ctive 11 activ ities, g or g . Given the gover nmen
t's prefe rence
1
2
funct ion, we were able to indic ate the choic e of the polic
y instru ment,
g , which maxim ized the gover nmen t's objec tive funct ion.
0
The gover nment , howev er, does not act in a vacuum since
j_ts choic e
of expen diture polic y has a direc t effec t .on outpu t and
profi ts in the
priva te secto r.

A simpl e barga ining model , taking into accou nt the pref

erenc es of the priva te secto r, can illus trate the regio
ns of confl ict and
comp lemen tarity betwe en the gover nment and the priva te
secto r in the
choic e of polic y instru ments .
i

In Figur e 4, we have drawn an oppor tunity locus or barga
ining curve
betwe en vario us comb inatio ns of the priva te surpl us (net
of taxes ),

n,

and publi c surpl us, g • It is obvio us from our prece ding
analy sis that
0
varia tions int and g will affec t the surpl us of both
the gover nment and
1
· priva te secto r. If the economy is withi n the front ier,
say at point A,
then a chang e int or g

will make both secto rs )Jette r off by moving to,
1
say, point Bon the front ier. There is then a compl ement
ary relati onshi p
I

betwe en the two surpl uses for given chang es int or g
.

1

Once at point Bi,

howev er, a trade -off betwe en priva te and publi c surpl us
exist s and a paten 
. tial movement to point C must invol ve us tv"ith a polit ical
barga ining proce ss
or the speci ficati on of a soda l welfar e·" funct ion, U(g
0 ~. ir), for the entir e

Figure 4·
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economy.

In the followi ng discus sion, we will derive this opport unity

locus and provid e some possib le reasons why certain underd evelope d coun
tries might end up within the frontie r.
The bargain ing model is charac terized by two equatio ns relatin g the
govern.rnent surplus (g ) and the private surplu s. (ir) to the two policy
in
0
strume nts, the rate of tax on profits (t) and the level of produc tive
ex
penditu re (r; ).

1

The governm ent surplus is defined as the excess of revenue

over expend iture on g

1

and the private surplus as after tax profits :

(1)

Government surplus equatio n

80 =

(2)

Private surplus equatio n.

fr

..

trr - 81

(1

t) Tf

where the range of the variab les is restric ted so that t lies between
0
and 1, and g

0

is always positi.v e.

The family of governm ent iso surplus curves will be U-shape d as
picture d in Figure 5 (the diagram has been drm,m to scale using specif
ic
analyt ical functio ns describ ed in the append ix).

The slope of this

curve is clefined as follows :

dt

The denomi nator of this expres sion,

ag_o
at
ago
.
at, is

always positiv e since

for a given expcrd iture on gl' ·an increas e in the tax rate will increas
e
revenue and hence the governm ent surplu s.
low values of g

1

and then becomes negativ e.

The numera tor is positiv e for
As we saw in Figure 2, the

governi ~ent surplus at first increas es for a given tax rate as more is
spent on g , but then decreas es after the point where the margin al produc
1

- 17 tivit y of g

1

(_d1T ) falls below 1
t.

This can be shown alge braic ally· from equa 

agl

tion 1:

>

0

0

0

<

0

1

as

t

It shou ld be n<Jted in Figu re 5 that the turni
ng poin t occu rs at larg e valu es
of g the high er is t. The shap e of the iso
gove rnme nt surp lus curv e is
0
thus nega tive and then posi tive as the nume rator
chan ges sign with incr eas
ing g . The turn ing pofo t shif ts upward and
to the righ t for high er iso
1
gove rnme nt suro lus curv es (the read er is again
refe rred to the_a ppen dix
for a form al deriv ation using spec ific anal ytica
l func tions ).
The iso l)rof its curv e is much simp ler to deriv
e beca use an incre ase in
g alwa ys has a posi tive effe ct on prof its afte
r tax uhil e a;.1 incre ase in
1
t ahmy s has a nega tive effe ct. The slop
e of the iso prof it curv e is ther e
fore alvay s posi tive (see Figu re 6)*
aft

dt

agl
--afr -

-- -

at

*From equa tion 2, ue have dfr = afr
ag
= (1
I

aft

dgl + -at_ dt

1
-

t ) -<l,r

ogl

(lgl -

1T

Sett ing dfr, = 0 to deriv e our iso urof it
curv__l::y we have

(

dt

![
. -1T

whic h is clea rly posi tive. Figu re 6 is draw
n to scal e acco rding to the
deriv ation found in the appe ndix .

I
!

I
,-;
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Figure 5
Iso-·Surplus Curves.

Figur e 6
!so-P rofit Curve s

- 20 The iso gover.nm ent surnlus curve and the iso profit curve can be
superim posed on an Edgewo rth Bor,Jley type diagram (Figure 7).

The tan-·

gencie s of iso profit and iso surolus curves yield a contra ct curve
showing the trade-o ff betv1een ir and g,., id.th optima l combin ations of
t and
V
g •
1

If we map the points on this contra ct curve onto a {fr, g } space:1
0
we then derive the opport unity locus as in Figure l},
A theory of bargain ing as well as a theory of politic s would be
~

necess ary to predic t the eventu al resting point.

He may for the moment

confine ourselv es to one case to illustr ate that many countr ies may
not
be on the contra ct curve.
Suppos e we begin with a given tax rate

e..

The govern ment's expend i-

ture policy is then a straigh t line parall el to the g
to the taxis.

As g

1

axis and perpen dicular

increas es:1 ~O increas es up to point A and fi increas es

up to point B which is beyond A.
mize g

1

Suppos e the governm ent chooses to maxj_-

i

0

by restini at A.

It is obviou s that both parties could be made

better off by increas ing t and g
to the contra ct curve.

1

in some combin ation that moves the economy

t!ill such a move necess arily occur?

sector may very well resist it.
. ment to a.n efficie nt one.

The private

It may prefer a lazy incor:i.p etent govern -

An efficie nt governm ent ,:muld move to the con

tract curve, but once there, might decide to move along it by squeez
ing
profits .

It may be in the private sector 's intere st to kee;p the governm ent

as a satisfi cer by giving it enough g

0

to keep it stable and conten t, even

though this sacrifi ces efficie ncy,
This simple analys is covers only two variab les.

In the real world,

the governm ent woulc;-; no doubt: be interes ted in other targets (employ
ment~
output , etc.).

These also vary as·g

1

varies .

A specif ication of social
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-- 22 welf are func tions uoul d be llt'.:!Cessary to analy
ze_ the I'lOre comp lex case .
dXl
dL
For the moment we may mere ly note that the deriv
at:Lv es - - , d- ~ etc.
1
cgl
gl
all have diffe rent valu es and there is no uniq
ue maximum for the soci ety.

IV.

A DYN.MHC HODEL

l1ovem ents along the effici ency fronti er for g

0

and fr have impor tant

dynam ic implic ations which should be taken into accoun t when
choosi ng the
appro priate govern ment fiscal policy .

Profit s are one of the major source s

of privat e saving s in underd evelop ed count ries and the level
of fr become s
an impor tant detenn inant of the rate of privat e capite l format
ion.

In a

simila r vein, the govern ment uses some part of its surplu s,
g , for capita l
0
forma tion and develo pment . A partic ular combin a.tion of fr artd
g in one
0
period determ ir:es the level and mix of privat e and public inv2st
ment and
hence the rate of growth of. the economy.
Suppo se, for examp le, govern ment invest ment is zero and that
the pri
vate sector reinve sts some fracti on s

1

of i_ts net profit s.

The greate r

the level of fr permi tted the privat e sector the greate r the
rate of capita l
1
forma tion and hence the greate r the outwar d shift in the efficie
ncy fronti er.
This is illust rated in Figure 8 which shows the effici ency fronti
er of period
(t

+

1) corres pondin g tq a choice of point A B, C, or Din period
1
(t).

If point A is chosen so that ft= 0 and g

0

is a maximum, no capita l forma tion

occurs and the effici ency fronti er remain s statio nary.
so that

P
oo

If point Dis c"hosen

is zero and fr a maximum., the effici ency fronti er shifts to the

maximum possib le exj:en t.

B anc} C are interm edia•te choice s.

The govern ment's choice of g

0

dn one period thus affect s its possi bil

ity of choice in the next period and so on ad infini tum.

The optimum choice

from the govern ment's point of view depend s upon its horizo n
and time pref
erence .

Suppo se, for exam.ple, the govern ment's time horizo n extend s
only

one period and it derive s no utilit y from iT.

He assume then that at (t + 1)

- 23a -

Figure 8
Efficie ncy Front:i· er for g
..

0

nnd

ir

the governrr. ent uill choose the point where fr(t -:- 1) :: 0 anc! g (t + 1) :f.s
0
a maximum. A one period Fisher producti o~i possibi lities curve can then
be derived from Figure C showing for each g

s0

Bo

obtainab le at (t

+

at time (t), the amom,t of

l):*

*The well-kno wn fonnula for deriving the. present val us of g
0
next period is

\•Jhere :t is the discoun t rate.

This uill be max:tmiz ed 1-1hen
(1

or>

0

i :::, .. [F 1 (,,· )
"'0'

-'-,

1)

.

+

i)

+

F, (g )
0

r.

0

_!10H

and

- 25 A more inte rest ing mod el allow s both the
pub lic and privc.1.te sect ors
to cont ribu te to cap: Ltal form ation .

used by the prtv ate sect or;

Ther e are two type s of cap:.i.tc:l stoc k

K whic h _is the priv ate cap ital stoc
k cons ist-·
1

ing of plan t, equi pme nt 9 etc.~ and K
whic h :i.s the pub lic cap ital stoc k
2
con sisti ne of infr astr uctu re, human cap
ital, etc. Priv ate inve stme nt is
a func tion of prof its and pub lic inve
stHc nt is a func tion of reve nue.

The

basi c mod el is as follo ws:

(3.1 ) \~

y = F(K ,
1 K2' L)

(3.2 )

I l = sfr

(3. 3)

12 = g t

(3.4 )

go -

-

s (1

t)

1T

1T

G - 12

wher e:
y

= tota l priv ate outp ut
;
= priv ate cary ital stoc k
===

pub lic cap ital stoc k

L

= labo r empl oyed in Y

1

1

= priv ate inve stme nt

r2

::; ~r1v ate inve stme nt

s

= priv ate savi ngs rate

~) ~,.t,\ ;'c.

g

gove rnme nt savi ngs rate

t

-- tax rate on prof its (rr)

fr

-- priv ate prof its net of taxe s

g

1

0

G

= publ ic surp lus
= tota l gove rnme nt expe ndit ure

*(3. 1) is assum ed to be a cons tant retu r~s to
scal e prod ucti on func tion .

~iffer entiat ing (3.1) totall y? we have
(3.5)

but c1I~

1

dY = £

1

dKl

+

f

dI~

2

::: I , dK = 1 and f
2
1
2
3

a perfec tly

(i.e.~ we assume

2

+

£

3

dL

w where

:a:

-"•

w is

the wage rate assume d given

elasti c supply of labor gt the given w). ~';

(3, 5) can then be rewr.i tten as

(1.6)
(3.7)

dY - w dL = £ 1 1 +f 1 , or
1
2 2
dn = t s(l - t) n + £ g CTI
1
2

where we have used equati ons (3. 2) and (3. 3).

(3.

·n

can be conver ted into a growth equati 9n showin g the rate
of

grOT.vth of privat e profit s in terms of the two instru menta l variab
les> t
and g, as follow s:

The govern ment l howev er, is intere sted in its sur1Jlu s (g
). There is then
0
a relatio nship betwee n n* and the relati ve public privat e sur~lu
s ratio

go

(n) as follow s: .

By defin ition, g

fo

gt = t - -

(3. 9)

0

= (1 - g) t

Tr

where tn == G [see equati on (3. 4)], and

Subst ituting this into the growth equati on (3. 8) we have

TI

1p', :::

fl s(l · t)

+

go

f ( t - -) •
2

For a given t, n* == F(gO) where
Tl

Tf

<

o.

*The partia l deriva tives? f., indica te the releva nt margin
al
produ ctivit ies of the privat e
public capite l, and labor.

ana
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Thes e grow th equa tion s can be used to illu
stra te the grow th path s asso; _
ciat ed with diff eren t leve ls of the instr
ume ntal vari able s g and t, To an
ticip ate our resu lts 1 the mod el show s that
the gove rnme nt must choo se among
grow th path s such as the ones depi cted in
Figu re 9. Path A has a high er ini
tial leve l of g than Path B but a loue r
rate of grow th. Path B sacr ific es
0
· pres ent g but gene rate s a high er rate
of grow th give n a high er init ial g or
0
lowe r t than Path A.
Let us now turn to the deri vati on of the
gove rnm ent's deci sion rule s for
So
a give n (-) . Diff eren tiati ng equa tion
(3. 9) part iall y with resp ect to t re1T
80
veal s that for a give n (-.;) the grow th rate
of rr and g rise s or fall s as t
0
incr ease s ,dep endi ng on whe ther f s;.:;< f
1 > 2' or

•whe re -ih* ~ 0 as £ s => f •
.at >
1 <
2

This resu lt can be give n a stra ight forw ard
inte rpre tatio n.

f

2

is the pro

duc tivit y of a doll ar 1 s wort h of inve stme
nt in pub lic cap ital form atio n.· £ s
1
is the prod ucti vity of a doll ar's wort h of
tax redu ctio n to the priv ate sect or
taki ng into acco unt both the prod ucti vity
of priv ate cap ital and the leak age into
pri
vate -consU111ption. For a give n leve l of g , the
gove rnme nt will wish to have
0
all capi tal for.mati.on takin g plac e eith er
in K or K depe ndin g upon whe ther
1
2
f 1s ~ £ .

2

He can summ arize the resu lts of this mode
l in the follo wing two deci sion ,
rule s:

Case 1. If f

2 > f 1s, the gove rnme nt sets t at a maximum, i.e. equa l to 1, thus

redu cing priv ate inve stme nt to zero .

.

,r*

The grow th equa tion then beco mes

go

= f (1 - -;) ,
2

The high er the leve l of g

0

the lowe r the rate of grow th of n)~ and henc e of
g .
.,
0

- 28 Figure S

Alternative I'aths of g

0

_

f'.,~

f/o
/\

fJt,

.!i

g

0

t0

Path A~

Higher initial

Pa.th B:

Sacrifice present

but 101/·er rate of gr m 1th.

g tut hir;her rate of gr.mvth as hishe.r initial
0

:i.s sp2nt only on comiumpt:Lons th2n proclen. o..1 ly of time preference,

Case 2.

I
government sets public capital formation at zero

go

and raises taxes only for g 01 i.e., t = -

ir*

80

1T

•

The growth equation then becomes

== fl s (1 - --; )

and again there is a trade-off between the share of profits devoted to g

0

~nd the. rate of grm-.rthl) the higher the t the lower the rate of grm.rth.

These two cases. however. illustrate only partial solutions, since
they assume f,s and f2 uill remain constant over time.
J.

In fact, they 1:-1il

K
vary as t.be ratio of 1 changes.
17
"2

.
f s
Kl .
1
.;- w:i.11 fall and
1·~2

I;-

will rise until f s - £ .
1
2

. - K
f s
K * > Ol) therefore K1 rises and /1
2

In Case 2, K i•; = 0 and
2

vHl fall.

2

The equilibrium growth path w-ill always, therefore, tend to what we
call Case 3 where £ s = £ .

1

equal

K*.

Kl

K

.. 2

Hill

the particular public private Ca!)ital ratio which equates

f s to f •

1

Along the equilibrium growth path,

2

2

The ratio of 1

maintain the growth path.

1

to

r2

~dll also have to be equal to

K* to

We can then solve fort along; this equilibrium

path as follows:
Solving (3. 9) for the equilibrium gro·1th rate yields
(1 - t)

K
,80
-~

· 1 + K ~- n
Therefore, t = - - - - -

Cl + K)
Our major conclusion from this model that the government must choose

·b etween (-gO) an d
1T

' stil 1 h ol ds.

1T~

Th is can easi 1y b e seen by once again

turnirig to equatfon (3. 9) and letting

fis

= £

2

for_ equilibrium .

This

I

I
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yields

!?:o

f s (1 - --)
1
. Tr

and the government' s choice betxveen

,80

Tr~':

and b-)
is again evident.
'1f

We may_now briefly examine some of the factors which enter into the
government' s choice of growth })aths.

First? let us sup;.Jose g

0

is spent

entirely on public consumption in the interest of either the nation as a
whole or some particular group in· control.
then simply one of time preference.

The optimizatio n problem is

Given a time rate of d;!.scount, the

government can choose_ the income stream that maximizes the present dis~
counted value of a stream of g

0

with initial value

g0

and a rate of growth

It is, however, more interesting and relevant to assume that g

0

is used,

at least in part? for general developmen tal purposes or for some other
productive activity.

Suppose g

0

is used as an investment in another sector

Y which will also feed back revenue to the eovernment when it becomes
2
productive.

Sup~ose that this alternate outlet for investment funds has a

rate of return of r •
2

The flow of funds to the government is now composed

the first is g e r 1t , the surplus gen2rated by the sector
0
Y analyzed above; the second stream is 8 e r 2 t ~ the stream generated by
1
0
investing g in a development pro8ram. The funds av.e.ilable to the ~overn
of two streams:

0

tWe would calculate the present discounted value of

J~

g (O)e <sol'~-.r) tdt
0

where r is the discount rate, and T the end of the planning period. IntegO(O)
(g *-r)T
grating we have .,.
[e O
-1].
8"·-r
Given that g l't ""' F(; ) the maximum could be calculated from the oint of
. ·
0
°0 '
view of the government.
o_

- 31 ment at some future point will therefore be;

The governmen t will maximize the discounte d value of this stream~ keeping
in mind that r

1 is a declining function of fo•

Hill be a declining function of g

0

(It is also lilr.e]_y that r

if there are diminishi ng returns·.

2

A

more realistic variant, too complicat ed to analyze here, is to assume that
the developme nt program has a long gestation period so that for the first
n years it yields zero return.
Finally, we explore a model in which the governmen t invests in a
capital stock which increases the_produ ctiv;ity of labor il"l the governmen t
sector itself.

He assume that there is a governmen t productio n function

relating output of the governmen t sector to its oun capital stock 2.nd to
labor employed by the governmen t

(4.1)

G = G (K, L).*
I

Labor is available in unlimited amounts at a fixed wage rate w.

Governmen t

investmen t is the surplus of revenue over wages
(lf,2)

I=

r. - wL

We further assume that R is L~etermined autonomou sly and grows at a
constant rate Ri,.

A balanced growth path is then defined in Hhich all

variables are growing at the same rate:

G*

=

K* = L* =I*= R*.

t:The governmen t productio n function is assumed to be a constant returns ,
to scale function.

In this model, the governm ent's instrum ental variable is its savings
rate, i. e,, the fraction of total revenue in each period which it devotes
to its own investm ent.
trary levels of R.

The choice is illustra ted in Figure 10 for arbi-.

We assume that

.
I
.implyin g a constan t savings
rate

R.

the governm ent chooses an e2cpansio n path
It is easy to show that given an

exogeneo usl.y determin ed rate of growth of R, there is one optimum sevings
rate that provides the highest possible grm-,th path for G.

'i'here exists

then a golden rule for governm ent investm ent alo,:i~ a balanced growth path
equal to P)', which is the analogue to the natural grm:th r&te.

We know that alon;; the balanced growth path, capital grows at the same
rate as revenue or

I

=

::R,.,.

Substitu ting this in equation (Lf. 2) above,

,-1e obtain for any point of time

(4. 3)

R = R* K

+

wL.

This equation provide s the governm ent with the opportu nity cost of ca!lital
and labor.

The governm ent can vary· its capital la.bar ratio by varying its

savings rate as long es it satisfie s equation (4.3).
The :;,roblem for the governm ent is to choose the IC and L which maximiz es
G (equatio n (4.1)) subject to the constra int that R = R1~

I(

+ ~1L.

The solu

tion is :Ulustra ted graphic ally in Figure 11.

The maximum occurs where the
fl
H
ratio of the mar,gina l product ivity of labor and ce.pitaL -equa]c
, f2
~
R
This is the gcilden rule for the governm ent.
$

-~-

It is interest ing to relate.t his to other formula tions of the golden
rule.

By Euler's theorem ,

and by equation (4.3) above,

. - 33 -.

Figu re 10

L

Jc

Figure 11

0
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Suppo se

we

assum e that we can conve rt the gover nmen t's equat ion
to monet ary

-terms by multi plyin g throug h by P

g

such that PG== R.
g

In other words , we

assum e (as is the usual pract ice) that the value of gover
nment outpu t is
equal to the value of total reven ue and to expen ¢litur
e by the gover nment in
inves tment and on labor . Our equa· tions would then read:

PG= P f L + P f K
g
g 1
g 2
R

Since

-· wL + pJqz.

fl

f

2

=

w
i,'>.

we concl ude that

w =

Along the golde n rule path, the margi n~l revenu e produ
ct of capit al equal s
the growt h rate and the margi nal reven ue produ ct of labor
equal s the wage
rate •.

It is impor tant to note that :i,.n order to obtai n this
resul t, we as

sumed that the value of gover nment outpu t in any year
equal led the value
of curre nt expen diture s plus capit al expen diture s.

The true defin ition of

total value shoul d be curre nt expen diture , wL, plus imput
ed capit al costs .
Our fonnu la requi res the assum ption that capit al costs
shoul d be imput ed at
the rate of growt h Ric.

INTERACTION BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT AND THE PRIVATE SECTOR

Appendix
to

Section III

The bargaining model can be written as follows (definition of var
iables are found in the t.ext):

2.

=K

K

Bx

3.

4.
5.

=

w
I

R = tn

= (1

ft

1
L
=

p

t(l
t)n

Equation 1 describes the production function for the private sec
tor.

It is assumed to be Cobb-Douglas.

the effect of g

1

In this production function,

is like neuttal technological change in the sense that

it does not affect the marginal rates of substitution between Kand L.
For many purposes, it would be more interesting and relevant to explore
the possibility that government expenditure on, say, research or edu
cation is biased towards capital or labor.

Note that g

1

is assumed to

be a flow whereas many government activities, e.g., roads and darns are
better viewed as a capital stock.

The model might be viewed as describ

:i.ng periods of tiri1e longer than one year, or if viewed as a. short-run
model, as covering only the recurrent expenditure of government on maintaining roads, providing information, etc.
Equation 2 assumes that the private capital is fixed in the period
of consideration.
Equation 3 indicates that labor is hired up to the point where the
wage rate equals the marginal product.

Because of the Cobb-Douglas as-

- 2 -

sumption and the assumption of constant wages and_ prices, this yields
an expression for labor as a simple non-linear function of

L

=

PSX

w

Equation

lf

x1 :

1

shows total revenue for the government (equal to total

expenditure ) as a constant ratio of profits.

Profits before tax

is

the residual after paying wages and because of the Cobb-Dougla s assump
tion is a constant share of output.
Equations 5 and 6 derive respectivel y profits after tax (ft) and
total Rand G.
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The two families can be combined on a single diagram as in
Figure 7A.

The tangend.es of iso-profit and iso-surplus curves

yield the contract curve for the specific model in this appendix.
As noted, the general case is found in the text.
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